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A country’s form of government has important economic and political consequences, but the 
determinants that lead countries to choose either parliamentary or presidential systems are 
largely unexplored. This paper studies this choice by analyzing the factors that make countries 
switch from parliamentary to presidential systems (or vice versa). The analysis proceeds in 
two steps. First, we identify the survival probability of the existing form of government 
(drawing on a proportional hazard model). In our model, which is based on 169 countries, we 
find that geographical factors and former colonial status are important determinants of 
survival probability. Also, presidential systems are, ceteris paribus, more likely to survive 
than parliamentary ones. Second, given that a change has taken place, we identify the 
underlying reasons based on panel data logit models. We find that domestic political factors 
are more important than economic ones. The most important factors relate to intermediate 
internal armed conflict, sectarian political participation, degree of democratization, and party 
competition, as well as the extent to which knowledge resources are distributed among the 
members of society. 
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Recently, research into the economic effects of constitutions has increased notably, with form of 
government being particularly thoroughly analyzed. A number of authors attribute wide-ranging ef-
fects to form of government. Persson and Tabellini (2003), for example, derive the following re-
sults (see also Blume et al. 2009): (1) government spending is some 6% of GDP lower in presiden-
tial compared with parliamentary systems; (2) the size of the welfare state is about 2–3% lower in 
presidential systems; (3) presidential systems seem to have lower levels of corruption; and (4) 
presidential systems appear to be a hindrance to increased productivity, but this result is not highly 
significant. 
If constitutions have such far-reaching effects, it is important to better understand how they evolve 
over time and what factors influence these changes. Although this process is one of the core issues 
in constitutional economics, few papers have actually studied constitutional change. This paper un-
dertakes to identify the determinants of change in the form of government. We choose form of 
government as our explanandum because, in terms of economic effects, the distinction between 
parliamentary and presidential systems is one of the most analyzed and—apparently—one of the 
most significant in constitutional political economy. 
It is often assumed that constitutions in general and form of government in particular are changed 
only very infrequently. Not true. Elkins et al. (2009) show that the expected survival length of con-
stitutions is only some 17 years. In fact, changes in form of government are fairly frequent, as Fig-
ure 1 shows. For our sample period, which runs from 1950 to 2003, we observe 123 such changes. 
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The upper panel of Figure 1 suggests that changes in form of government take place throughout the 
sample period. The highest peak is seen during the early 1990s and the lowest peak in the mid 
1970s. In the lower panel, the changes are differentiated with regard to direction of change. There 
are 68 changes from presidential to parliamentary forms of government and 55 changes in the op-
posite direction. The peak in constitutional activity identified in the early 1990s is mainly due to 
countries switching from presidential to parliamentary forms of government.   4
To emphasize the dynamics of institutional choice, we do not analyze first-time constitutional 
choices, but instead focus on changes in form of government that occur later in a country’s history. 
Robinson and Torvik (2008) note that most African countries established a parliamentary form of 
government in their early post-colonial period but that many of them have now switched to the 
presidential form of government. We therefore ask: Given that a country “originally” chose a par-
liamentary system, under what conditions is it likely that form still prevails today? In addition, 
which factors will affect the probability of switching to a presidential form of government? 
We study two questions empirically, namely: (1) When is a switch likely to occur? and, given that 
a switch has occurred, (2) Why did it occur? The first question is answered by analyzing time-
invariant factors in the framework of a proportional hazard model; the second question is investi-
gated by considering time-variant factors in the context of panel data logit models. 
Our main results, for a sample of 169 countries, show that a switch is more likely to occur if the 
“initial constitution” is parliamentary rather than presidential, if the country was never a British or 
French colony, and if the country is located in either the Middle East, North Africa, Sub-Saharan 
Africa, East Asia, Southeast Asia, or South Asia. In a much smaller sample, we test the influence 
of additional variables and find that those countries that have reformed their constitution once are 
less likely to alter it again. Countries characterized by a high degree of ethnic and religious frac-
tionalization are more likely, and countries with a high degree of ethnic polarization are less likely 
to change their form of government; countries are considered as highly fractionalized if many di-
verse groups are present, whereas they are considered as highly polarized if two different groups of 
similar size exist. Countries with a high proportion of Muslims are more likely to amend their con-
stitutions. Former colonial powers are less likely to change their constitutions. Finally, we find evi-
dence that resource endowment appears to be a relevant factor; countries characterized by a high 
share of primary exports in GNP are less likely to adjust the form of government.  
The main factors influencing the likelihood of a change in form of government are political. Sys-
tems of sectarian political participation, where incompatible interests lead to intense factionalism 
and government favoritism, show a greater probability of constitutional reform. Internal govern-
ment crises and limited armed conflict make changes more likely. A high degree of democratiza-
tion in societies will foster change, whereas strong democratic competition and participation tends 
to prevent alterations in the form of government. If the relative number of students and literates in a 
country rises, it becomes less likely that the society will initiate constitutional reform. 
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 discusses two competing viewpoints re-
garding the form of government and provides an overview of the very scant literature on endoge-
nous constitutional choice. Section 3 develops a number of hypotheses as to the factors that deter-  5
mine a switch from parliamentary to presidential systems, or vice versa. Section 4 sets out our em-
pirical approach and a description of the data. Section 5 addresses the question of when the form of 
government is likely to change and Section 6 the question of which factors help explain the occur-
rence of constitutional reform. Section 7 concludes. 
 
2 Form of Government—Competing Views 
We now provide a survey of the relevant literature. If we confined ourselves to studies analyzing 
the determinants of change in form of government, the section would be extremely short, possibly 
nonexistent, as we could find virtually nothing on the topic. There is a little work on the endogeni-
zation of constitutional choice in general. However, in this section we also discuss two competing 
viewpoints as to the relevance of different forms of government (parliamentarian and presidential). 
As these viewpoints are radically different regarding possible determinants of constitutional change, 
we begin by presenting both, illustrating each with examples from Africa. The first view is closely 
connected to the work of Persson et al. (1997), whereas the second one has been argued by Lijphart 
(1992). 
Most of the relevant political economy analyses are based on the premise that the choice of form of 
government invariably means more or less separation of powers: in parliamentary systems, the 
(head of the) executive depends for survival on retaining the confidence of the majority of the leg-
islature. In presidential systems, the president can survive in office even without the confidence of 
the legislature. Presidential systems thus have an additional veto player or a higher degree of sepa-
ration of powers, which has far-reaching effects, as Persson et al. (1997) argue in their seminal pa-
per. 
Robinson and Torvik (2008) point out that Persson et al. (1997) were greatly influenced by the sys-
tem in place in the United States but that presidential systems in Latin American and Africa are dif-
ferent from the U.S. experience in a number of ways. For example, presidents in other countries of-
ten have more formal powers (e.g., budget initiative). Additionally, they often even enjoy legisla-
tive powers such as the power to decree new legislation without approval from other legislative 
bodies. Regarding the African experience with presidential systems, Prempeh (2008, 110) cites the 
“imperial presidency” and gives numerous examples of the wide-ranging power of African presi-
dents (“government by press release,” i.e., without having consulted parliament; presidents often 
control slush funds that are not subject to legislative oversight; legislation often gives explicit lee-
way to the president [“as he thinks fit,” “as he may prescribe”]; in some countries, the president 
even chooses the speaker of parliament and has vast appointment powers as to nearly all nonlegis-
lative constitutional and statutory offices).   6
How do presidents obtain legislative approval of their policies? One way is to offer lucrative jobs 
and/or buy the support of legislators. Prempeh (2008, 116) gives an example from Zambia in which 
President Chiluba appointed nearly half the total number of legislators to ministerial positions 
within his administration. Further, presidents’ parties sometimes actually have the power to expel 
legislators from parliament if they oppose the president. This occurred, for example, in Zambia in 
2001 when the ruling party expelled 22 of its legislators for their opposition to President Chiluba’s 
attempt to secure a third term of office. Sometimes, the constitution even explicitly allows for ex-
pulsion of parliamentarians who have voted as they saw fit. Article 77(l) of the Sierra Leone Con-
stitution, for example, states that a “legislator must vacate his seat ‘if by his conduct in Parliament 
by sitting and voting with members of a different party, the Speaker is satisfied after consultation 
with the Leader of that Member’s party that the Member is no longer a member of the political 
party under whose symbol he was elected to Parliament’” (Prempeh, 2008, 118). Prempeh (ibid., 
117) argues that the lack of internal democracy in Africa’s parties facilitates presidential domi-
nance: “In the case of majority parties, this hierarchical and oligarchic control is usually exercised 
for the president’s benefit, if not at his behest.” Courts are said to follow a “jurisprudence of execu-
tive supremacy” (ibid., 118). 
In summary, it appears questionable whether presidential systems should be systematically catego-
rized as entailing a higher degree of separation of powers than parliamentary ones. Thus, in a coun-
try in which a limited number of elite groups decide upon the constitution, those who see them-
selves as future presidents (and their followers) might well lobby in favor of a presidential form of 
government. In other words, if the presidential form of government entails more concentrated 
power, then potential holders of that power might favor establishing such a form of government. 
Lijphart (1992) makes a distinction between consensual and majoritarian systems. Consensual sys-
tems are based on the norm that it is desirable to include most of society’s members in the most 
important decisions concerning the provision of public goods. Majoritarian systems, on the other 
hand, are characterized by the possibility of a simple majority making decisions against the inter-
ests of a sizable minority of citizens. At the margin, majority systems can be thought of as zero-
sum games. Lijphart interprets form of government as one important dimension in consensual ver-
sus majoritarian systems, grouping parliamentary systems in the former category and presidential 
ones in the latter. 
Aghion et al. (2004) deal explicitly with the choice between presidential or parliamentary forms of 
government treating it both normatively as well as positively. Although not framed in terms of the 
consensual-majoritarian distinction introduced by Lijphart (1992), their approach seems compatible 
with it. Aghion et al. ask how much “unchecked power” a society should optimally delegate to its   7
leaders, then proceed to ask under what conditions countries can be expected to choose that optimal 
degree of delegation, and, finally, turn to some cross-country analysis. They equate “insulation” 
with unchecked power. As between autocracy and democracy, autocrats are more insulated than 
democratically elected governments. Within democracy, presidential systems have a higher degree 
of insulation than parliamentary ones. What is the central driving force behind the variation in insu-
lation as defined here? Aghion et al. (ibid.) find that insulation is positively and significantly corre-
lated with both ethnic and linguistic fractionalization, meaning that highly fragmented countries are 
less democratic. However, if they are democratic, these fragmented countries can be expected to 
have a presidential rather than a parliamentary form of government. 
Buchanan and Tullock (1962, Ch. 5) discuss the basic decision-making rules rational individuals 
would agree to under various degrees of preference heterogeneity. Their approach asks what rules 
rational individuals would agree on if constitutional rules were chosen on the basis of unanimous 
agreement. It can thus be read as a conceptual benchmark against which real constitutional choices 
can be compared. They (ibid.) introduce the notion of external costs to the economic analysis of 
constitutions. These are costs “that the individual expects to endure as a result of the actions of oth-
ers over which he has no direct control” (ibid., 45). Buchanan and Tullock argue that rational indi-
viduals will take external costs into consideration when choosing constitutional rules. The more 
heterogenous the preferences across society, the higher the expected external costs that can be in-
flicted upon any individual. Assuming that they are uncertain about their position in society, ra-
tional individuals would strive to establish consensual constitutions because expected external costs 
are lower with this type of constitution than under majoritarian ones. Hence, the more heterogenous 
a society is in terms of preferences, the more adequate is the parliamentary form of government. If 
a heterogenous society did not “originally” choose a parliamentary system, we expect to observe a 
switch.1 
A specific aspect of preferences is the propensity to accept hierarchies. According to Aghion et al. 
(2004), presidential systems possess more unchecked power than do parliamentary ones. Thus, we 
conjecture that a high propensity to accept hierarchies fits relatively better to presidential systems, 
a low propensity to parliamentary ones. Robinson and Torvik (2008) explicitly endogenize presi-
dentialism. Based on a model with two groups (each consisting of citizens, politicians, and political 
leaders), they show that presidentialism is more attractive when the two groups’ preferences with 
regard to public goods are more polarized, when ideological differences are more extreme, and 
when the government budget is small, which Robinson and Torvik equate with poor countries. 
                                                 
1   Note that this conjecture is in direct opposition to the one developed by Aghion et al. (2004). Competing conjec-
tures make the necessity of empirical tests even more obvious.   8
Finally, Ticchi and Vindigni (2010) deal with the endogenization of major constitutional rules, re-
flecting Lijphart’s approach by distinguishing between majoritarian and consensual systems. They 
hypothesize that this choice is driven by the ex ante degree of income inequality: if it is relatively 
high, a majoritarian constitution is more likely, if it is relatively low, a consensual constitution is 
more likely. For our purposes, this means that the probability of a switch is high when either the 
“original” constitution, for whatever reason, made the “wrong” choice as to form of government or 
if the distribution of resources in the society has changed over time. Using different frameworks to 
think about forms of government results, unsurprisingly, in different ways of explaining their 
choice and change over time. Thinking about form of government in terms of separation of powers 
suggests that societies that want to protect themselves from the perils of government prefer a presi-
dential form of government, whereas societies that believe in the welfare-enhancing power of the 
state prefer parliamentary systems. Thinking about it in terms of consensual versus majoritarian 
terms implies that those societies that are willing to allocate vast powers to a single person—and 
accept that a sizeable segment of society will be dominated by another segment that is not much 
larger than the dominated one—prefer presidential systems, whereas societies that care about de-
liberation and consensus would opt in favor of parliamentary systems. On the basis of the two 
competing views just discussed, in the next section of the paper we derive some conjectures regard-
ing the determinants for the choice and changes in the form of government . 
 
 
3 Explaining Change in the Form of Government—An Exploratory Exposition 
Our brief survey of the literature shows that theoretical arguments purporting to explain switches in 
form of government are, to say the least, underdeveloped. In this section, we therefore explore a 
rather large number of potential drivers of such a switch. 
Explaining switches in form of government implies identifying reasons why the former status quo 
was changed. Our assumption is that change will take place only if the extant form of government 
does not adequately match the circumstances of its society. An “adequate” form of government is, 
thus, equivalent to a stable equilibrium. Note that this does not imply any normative evaluation re-
garding its welfare properties: an “adequate” form of government is simply one that does not in-
duce further change. Indeed, in the matter of economic development, there very well might be 
“bad” as well as “good” equilibria. Framed like this, we are interested in identifying those variables 
that affect the adequacy of the form of government given the characteristics of a country. 
The economic approach analyzes utility-maximizing choices under the assumption of given prefer-
ences. Hence, changes in behavior are attributed to changes in the relevant restrictions. Here, our   9
interest is in collective choices and the analysis is complicated by the fact that we need some way 
of aggregating individual preferences into collective choices. Outcomes regarding constitutional 
choices, therefore, are a result of an interplay between three groups of factors: preferences, proce-
dures used to aggregate them, and relevant restrictions. 
We first assume preferences and procedures to be given. We further propose to separate internal 
(domestic) and external (foreign) restrictions. For instance, in many countries, important foreign 
restrictions find their origin in former colonial powers, which exerted a strong influence on the 
choice of form government in their former colonies. If the colonial power’s influence was not con-
ducive to achieving an adequate fit of form of government in the sense just described, we would 
expect to observe more frequent change in former colonies than in noncolonies. Since the influence 
exerted by various former colonial powers might well be different, we need to also differentiate the 
various colonial powers (e.g., English or French).2 
In a second step, preferences are explicitly taken into account.  In economics, individual prefer-
ences are assumed to be stable. So how can they contribute to constitutional change? Our conjec-
ture is that the aggregation of individual preferences into interest groups is crucial. Some latent 
groups never manage to become organized. Among those who become organized, some become 
more powerful over time, whereas others lose influence. 
Institutions have distributive consequences. We propose to think of an initiator’s demand for con-
stitutional change as an indirect demand for distributional gain.3 Chances of successfully imple-
menting constitutional change are determined by the demander’s bargaining power vis-à-vis the 
rest of society. The bargaining power of a group is determined by its ability and willingness to in-
flict costs on others and thereby reduce total social surplus. The more such power an individual or a 
group of individuals has, the more influence the individual or group is likely to have on the con-
tents of the constitution. Or, put differently, if the number and composition of groups that have 
managed to solve the problem of collective action (Olson 1965), changes and/or their relative bar-
gaining power increases, constitutional change becomes a possibility. In the framework developed 
                                                 
2   We treat the following countries as colonial powers: Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Portu-
gal, Spain, the United Kingdom, and the United States. 
3   A priori, distributional gains can also be achieved via simple legislation. In the case of rational actors, the deci-
sion of whether distributional gains will be demanded via legislation or via constitutional change is determined 
by the respective expected net utilities over time: For example, potentially higher costs of initiating constitu-
tional change might be more than offset by the relatively longer expected duration of constitutional rules com-
pared to simple laws.   10
above, an inadequate choice of form of government is one that does not properly reflect the relative 
power of those organizations desiring a more self favoring distribution of cooperation rents.4 
To determine the adequacy of the form of government, the original choice is obviously crucial. We 
therefore propose to divide our exploratory analysis of potential factors determining the change in 
form of government into three phases. First, we briefly deal with the adequacy of the original 
choice. We then analyze the potential relevance of time-invariant factors. In the third phase, we de-
velop a number of hypotheses based on time-variant factors. 
 
The “Original” Choice 
Change in form of government means deviation from some former “original” choice. Over the last 
half-century, many countries became independent for the first time and have thus made their origi-
nal choice. In determining the factors causing change, the original choice is thus crucial. Lijphart 
(1992) classifies parliamentary systems as consensual, that is, they are based on the norm that most 
members of a society should consent to the most important decisions regarding the provision of 
public goods. However, if this norm is not shared by the elites, a parliamentary form of government 
might be an inadequate choice. Given that the elites are fairly homogenous, that they strive to es-
tablish a head of government with broad discretionary power, that they expect to remain in control 
regarding the appointment of the head of government in the foreseeable future, then we expect 
them to be in favor of a presidential system. If – in this situation – the “original choice” is parlia-
mentary, e.g. due to the influence of former colonial powers, an early switch is likely to occur. If, 
further, large segments of society have not managed to solve the problem of collective action and 
have themselves not (yet) organized in groups, there is no reliable means of guaranteeing that most 
people will have the opportunity or even the desire to participate in major decisions and so a par-
liamentary form of government might, again, be inadequate. If, on the other hand, there is a very 
small number of well-organized groups (in the extreme case, only one), then the presidential form 
of government might be an adequate fit.5 
                                                 
4   The last couple of decades have witnessed a still unresolved debate regarding the causes of economic develop-
ment. Lipset (1959) argues that economic development needs to precede the emergence of (democratic) political 
institutions. Acemoglu et al. (2007) purport to show that this is not true. Acemoglu and his various co-authors 
(e.g., Acemoglu and Robinson 2006) emphasize the distinction between political institutions, political power, 
and economic institutions. This strikes us as not very convincing since any kind of institution is political in the 
sense that it is the result of some sort of collective decision making. North et al. (2009) point out that the social 
sciences have not come to grips with the interactions of economic and political development. 
5   A recent paper by Guerriero (2009) analyzes the adequate choice of the general system of legislation and adju-
dication, i.e., the choice between statute law and common law, the first being more centralized than the letter. 
Guerriero is only interested in those countries in which a legal system has been transplanted. He finds that a   11
 
Conjectures Based on Time-Invariant Factors 
Our exploratory analysis of factors potentially causing constitutional change first deals with time-
invariant restrictions and then moves toward preferences. Procedures are mentioned only in closing. 
In the absence of a theory as to the relative importance of the various factors, we present them in 
the order of exogeneity, i.e., we begin with geographical factors and then move on to institutional 
ones. We discuss the following time-invariant factors drawing on geographical aspects: (1) latitude, 
(2) access to the sea and (3) natural resource endowment. We then turn to historical factors, namely 
(4) state antiquity, (5) colonial heritage and (6) legal origins. Finally, preferences are taken into ac-




Latitude and continent can be interpreted as proxies for underlying causes rather than as causes in 
and of themselves and thus may serve as control variables for other explanatory variables. However, 
geographic location contains information on the climate, soil, probability of natural disasters, ade-
quacy of crops, disease environment, and so forth. It is argued (Acemoglu and Robinson, 2001; 
Acemoglu at al. 2001) that the disease environment is an excellent predictor of institutional quality 
in general. Acemoglu et al. (2001) can also be interpreted as implying that favorable disease envi-
ronments are not only conducive to longer time horizons but also to more consensual decision mak-
ing. If this is indeed the case, countries characterized by favorable disease environments are more 
likely to opt for parliamentary systems.6 
Access to the sea is another important aspect of geography. It is claimed (e.g., Gallup et al. 1999) 
that such access can have important consequences for a country’s development. Whereas the export 
and import of goods primarily affects a country’s economic development, the import and exchange 
of ideas might affect its institutional development.  
Another important facet of geography is a country’s natural resource endowment. The so-called re-
source curse has been identified as an important factor preventing development (e.g., Mehlum et al. 
                                                                                                                                                                 
switch is more likely the higher the heterogeneity between transplanter and transplanted, and the weaker the in-
stitutions in the transplanted country. Drawing a not unreasonable analogy between his work and ours, in our 
case the transplanters are the former colonies and presidential systems are the equivalent of more centralized 
government. 
6   We do not include settler mortality in the models presented below, as the drop in sample size would be prohibi-
tively high. However, preliminary analysis suggests that this specific variable contains little predictive power 
for our question of interest.    12
2006, Andersen and Aslaksen 2008). Autocrats can cling to power by bribing any malcontents with, 
or the proceeds from selling, resources. In resource-rich countries, control of the state is very at-
tractive and fierce competition for same is to be expected. If each competing group is (over-
)confident that its representative could be president, they might agree on the presidential form of 
government. Alternatively, one can imagine a resource-rich country with a small and homogenous 
elite that manages to maintain a cartel. Survival rates of parliamentary constitutions are expected to 
be low in resource-rich countries.7 
 
Historical Factors 
Time-invariant institutional restrictions are the consequence of former choices made so long ago 
that they can be considered exogenous for the period analyzed. Bockstette et al. (2002) show that 
state antiquity is significantly correlated with political stability and institutional quality, among 
other variables. We conjecture that state antiquity also determines the survival probability of the 
form of government. Bockstette et al. argue that long-established states are likely to have better 
public administration. We extend and generalize this idea, arguing that long-established statehood 
is likely to be connected with a number of firmly established institutions and organizations. The 
more numerous these are, the more costly and, consequently, less likely constitutional change. In 
the spirit of Olson (1982), one could argue that a fairly long period of state stability will enable a 
large number of latent interest groups to become organized and start making demands to be heard 
in collective decision-making. This would imply that older states are more liable to have a parlia-
mentary form of government—and be able to sustain it over time.8 
As discussed above, it is easy to imagine an inadequate choice as to form of government being 
made if a foreign actor had an important influence on that choice. States that were never colonies 
face fewer external restrictions, can make a more adequate constitutional choice, and thus are less 
likely to switch their form of government than are former colonies. The various colonial powers’ 
different approaches to the independence process leads directly to our second—and more spe-
                                                 
7   Implicitly, this argument assumes that the value of the resources is well known at the time of constitution mak-
ing, which may not be the case. Suppose a constitution is established long before valuable resources are discov-
ered and the society manages to actually implement its consensual constitution over decades. Under such a sce-
nario, it is thus not the existence of valuable resources as such that could influence constitutional choice but the 
exact timing of their discovery. 
8   Bockstette et al. (2002) also mention that nationhood would foster linguistic unity, which might, in turn, lead to 
a sense of common identity. In our sample, we find that older nations have less linguistic fractionalization, 
which would support that hypothesis (correlation coefficient = -0.27). Of course, this correlation does not say 
anything about the causality relationship.   13
cific—hypothesis regarding former colonial powers: the survival of the original constitution is a 
function of the identity of the former colonizers. 
Different colonizers arrived with different concepts about and styles of legislation and adjudication. 
On the most general level, these different families have been grouped into common law and civil 
law. Among civil law regimes are the French, Scandinavian, German, and certain socialist systems 
(see, e.g., Zweigert and Kötz 1998). Ex ante it is unclear whether there is any relationship between 
adequacy of chosen form of government and the country’s historic legal family. Countries belong-
ing to the same legal family have different forms of government and have been able to sustain them. 
For example, both the United States and the United Kingdom belong to the common law family, 
but the former has the paradigmatic presidential system, whereas the latter has the classic parlia-
mentary system. Although there is a high correlation between former colonizers and legal families, 
the correlation is not perfect. This situation allows us to discover whether the former or the latter 




Picking up the external cost considerations introduced in Section 2 above, we hypothesize that the 
more heterogeneous a society is in terms of preferences, the more adequate is the parliamentary 
form of government. If a heterogeneous society did not “originally” choose a parliamentary system, 
we expect to observe such a switch. Further, we conjecture that a high propensity to accept hierar-
chies fits better to presidential systems and we expect a low probability of switching to parliamen-
tary ones in such countries. 
 
The last two conjectures focused on individual preferences, implicitly assuming that citizen prefer-
ences are relevant in constitutional choice. Whether this is actually the case, however, depends on 
the procedures employed to choose a constitution. There is a very small body of literature analyz-
ing the first-time choice of constitutions, in which such procedures as focused on as explanatory 
variables (Carey 2009; Voigt 2003; Widner 2007). Arguably, such an approach has not been par-
ticularly successful and therefore we do not put much emphasis on procedures in this paper. 
 
Conjectures Based on Time-Variant Factors 
In the introductory paragraphs of this section, one mechanism resulting in constitutional change 
was already briefly mentioned—changes in the bargaining power of groups could induce demand 
for such change. Here, a number of hypotheses are developed on the basis of that conjecture. Note   14
that the “adequacy” of constitutional choices acquires a slightly different meaning in the context of 
time-variant factors: when the number of strong collective actors grows over time, this could imply 
that a presidential system that used to be adequate is no longer so. We discuss four domestic, and 
one foreign, factors, namely: (1) the distribution of resources, (2) the capacity to act collectively, 
(3) the level of democracy, (4) economic performance, and (5) contagion. 
One important determinant of economic power is the distribution of resources, which, in turn, 
should be decisive for the constitutional provisions chosen. A high concentration of economic 
power implies that a small elite is very influential in the constitutional development of a country. In 
line with Ticchi and Vindigni (2010), we hypothesize that the likelihood of switching to the presi-
dential form of government increases with the concentration of economic power. 
Collective action is always necessary for constitutional change to occur, but many latent interest 
groups never manage to overcome the problem of collective action and thus never become actual 
interest groups (Olson 1965). But those groups that do manage to overcome the problem will de-
mand participation in important collective choices. A hypothesis along the lines of Lijphart (1992) 
would thus predict that the higher the number of organized interest groups, the more likely a soci-
ety is to choose the parliamentary form of government. 
This paper analyzes switches in the form of government independently of whether the country is 
run democratically or by autocrats. Yet, we conjecture that the degree of actually implemented de-
mocracy can be an important determinant of this kind of constitutional change. On the one hand, 
the public discussion of the pros and cons of constitutional change is less costly in firmly estab-
lished democracies. Democracies offer more structured means to change the constitution, which 
could make its actual occurrence more likely. On the other hand, this argument could also be 
turned around: democracies offer structured ways to exchange government, so demands for more 
basic constitutional changes are less likely to arise in the first place. 
 
Economic performance will affect the relative power of interest groups. In general, poor economic 
development will decrease government popularity and thus is expected to increase the likelihood of 
observing a higher demand for constitutional change. 
The four time-variant factors just discussed focus on domestic influence. Implicitly, we have as-
sumed that countries change their constitutions “in splendid isolation” (except for the degree of 
economic openness), but it is plausible that the likelihood of choosing a certain institutional ar-
rangement might be influenced by how many other states have already chosen that specific institu-
tion. The closer these states are along various dimensions (e.g., geographically, ethnically, linguis-
tically, etc), the higher might be the likelihood that one will do as one’s neighbors have done (for   15
diffusion models in general, see Elkins and Simmons 2005). With regard to Africa, Nwabueze 
(1975, 68) observes: “At pan-African gatherings, leaders from Commonwealth African countries 
whose position was only that of Head of Government, must have experienced a certain sense of 
disappointment at being denied the honour and dignity accorded to their counterparts who were 
Heads of State in their own countries.” Hence, we would expect a switch toward presidentialism to 
be more likely, the greater the number of a country’s neighbors that are already presidential. 
We have now presented a number of time-invariant and time-varying factors that are conjectured to 
have an impact on the choice of form of government as well as on its stability over time. In the next 
section, we describe our estimation approach and present our data in more detail. 
 
 
4 Empirical Approach and Data 
Empirical Approach 
Our empirical analysis considers the period 1950–2003, which means that we concentrate on mod-
ern history. The choice of this time period is partly dictated by data availability and partly because 
many countries only came into being after World War II. First, we study when constitutions are 
likely to be amended. Employing a large sample of countries (169 countries), we estimate survival 
rates of forms of government using the Kaplan-Meier nonparametric method and then investigate 
the influence of time-invariant factors on these survival rates with the help of Cox proportional 
hazard models. To investigate the impact of more of the factors discussed above, we repeat the 
analysis with a much smaller sample (87 countries). 
In the second part of the analysis, we study factors that may help explain why a switch from one 
form of government to another occurs. This issue is investigated in the framework of fixed-effects 
panel data logit models using a change in the form of government as the dependent variable. The 
unbalanced sample comprises 153 countries. 
For both these empirical analyses, the modeling approach is general to specific (see Hendry 1993), 
i.e., we start with a general model and eliminate insignificant variables in a consistent testing-down 
process to improve estimation efficiency. 
 
Dependent Variable 
We need a reliable indicator to determine both the survival probability of a given form of govern-
ment and the factors causing its change. To make global inferences, this indicator ought to be 
available for as many countries as possible. The indicator should be available as a time series that 
goes back at least until the 1950s, the period when many African states began to become independ-
ent. The defining characteristic of parliamentary systems is that the head of government depends   16
for survival in office on the continued confidence of a parliamentary majority. Our variable should 
thus be defined on the basis of this criterion. The indicator that best suits these criteria is provided 
by Banks (2004) and “refers to the degree to which a premier must depend on the support of a ma-
jority in the lower house of a legislature in order to remain in office.” We define a presidential sys-
tem as one where either the office of premier does not exist or if it does, it does not have any par-
liamentary responsibility. Parliamentary systems are defined as having a premier who is, at least to 
some extent, constitutionally responsible to the legislature.9 
 
Independent Variables 
Many indicators for the potentially relevant explanatory variables developed in the previous section 
are straightforward and these will not be described here. Table A3 in the Appendix provides sum-
mary information about the contents and sources of the variables, and Tables A1 and A2 set forth 
descriptive statistics. Here, we discuss, in the same order as the hypotheses in Section 3, only those 
variables that warrant a little more detail. 
Geographic location was the first potential time-invariant variable. Often, this variable is proxied 
for by using very coarse continent dummies. We prefer to classify our countries into one of 10 dif-
ferent regions, which is a more fine-grained approach and can distinguish, for example, between 
Latin American and Caribbean countries. In addition, we control for a country’s distance from the 
equator.  
It was conjectured that the age of statehood could have an impact on the likelihood of a switch in 
form of government. The age of statehood is proxied by the variable “statehist 5” constructed by 
Bockstette et al. (2002). They divide the period from 1 to 1950 CE into 39 half-centuries and ask 
for each of the resulting slices whether there was a government above the tribal level, whether that 
government was locally based or foreign, and how much of the current country’s territory was 
ruled by that government. The variable used here is based on a discount rate of 5% on each addi-
tional half-century. 
                                                 
9   Drawing on Alvarez et al. (1996), Golder (2005) has a variable “institution” that partially corresponds with form of 
government. However, he combines another aspect with it, namely, whether a country was democratic or a dictator-
ship in a given year. In other words, the de jure constitutional form is combined with the de facto degree of democ-
racy. The Banks variable also takes the effective situation into account but has the advantage of presenting values 
even for those years in which the country was not democratic. We code 0 and 1 in the original index as presidential 
and 2 and 3 as parliamentary. A move from, say, 1 to 2 or, put into words, from a system without responsibility of 
the premier toward the parliament towards a system where there is at least some responsibility, would count as a 
move from a presidential to a parliamentary system. The Database of Political Institutions (Beck et al. 2000) con-
tains a variable “system” that distinguishes between presidential and parliamentary systems. Unfortunately, its time 
series begins only in 1975.   17
The heterogeneity of preferences can be proxied for by a number of variables. Over the last decade, 
ethnolinguistic fractionalization has been used frequently. Usually, three dimensions of fractional-
ization are distinguished—ethnic, religious, and linguistic. Alesina et al. (2003) put forward three 
fractionalization indices, which distinguish carefully between ethnic, linguistic, and religious frac-
tionalization. Esteban and Rey (1994) argue that the concept of fractionalization might not ade-
quately capture important cleavages. The authors speculate that this problem is most likely to be 
present if the society under study is divided into two groups of similar size, a situation they refer to 
as polarization. We include this alternative proxy for the heterogeneity of preferences. 
The propensity to accept hierarchies is an individual trait and it is not easy to attribute such traits to 
entire countries. Yet, different religions have been evaluated as having different attitudes toward 
hierarchical structures. In his treatise on Italian regions, Putnam (1993) argues that the Catholic 
Church has a vertical organization structure. La Porta et al. (1997) generalize this result and clas-
sify Islam and the various Orthodox churches as having hierarchical structures.10 We thus propose 
to use the most prevalent religion in a country as a proxy for the propensity to accept hierarchies.  
The first of our time-variant factors is the distribution of resources. Vanhanen (1997) presents a 
number of proxy variables for the distribution of resources across a society. We draw on three of 
them here. “Share of family farms” counts the area of such farms as a percentage of total farmland. 
Even though such an indicator may not be particularly relevant for industrial countries, it is a useful 
one for the distribution of resources in many less developed countries, which make up the largest 
part of our sample. The variable “knowledge distribution” reflects the extent to which knowledge 
resources are distributed among the members of society. It is the arithmetic mean of the percentage 
of students among the entire population and the percentage of a country’s population that is literate. 
The variable “urban population” gives the percentage share of urban dwellers to total population. 
The second time-variant factor is the degree to which individuals have formed organizations and 
are thus able to act collectively. One way to proxy for this would be to count all nongovernmental 
organizations (NGOs) active in a country but such an indicator is not available. What is available is 
an indicator counting the number of trade associations, listed in the World Guide to Trade Associa-
tions (Coates et al. 2007), which covers up to 140 countries over the period from 1973 to 2002. A 
second indicator counts the number of international NGOs (INGOs) present in a given country 
(Paxton 2002). Both indicators are far from ideal as they rely on a subsample of all NGOs but are 
the best we could find.11 The correlation coefficient between the two variables is positive and rea-
sonably high (0.58), which suggests that they are measuring the same latent variable. Since Coates 
                                                 
10   We follow their classification here although it is debatable whether Islam should be classified as hierarchic. 
11   In addition, an ideal measure would take not only the number of groups into consideration but also their size.   18
et al.’s (2007) indicator is available only from the mid 1970s onward, we use the number of INGOs 
in our analysis to preserve a longer time series. 
The third time-variant factor conjectured to have an impact on constitutional change is the level of 
democracy actually implemented in a country. There has been intense debate on how best to meas-
ure democracy, it being a prime example of an “essentially contested concept” (Gallie 1956). Alva-
rez et al. (1996) make the point that continuous measures make little sense in this regard; in other 
words, a country is either democratic or it is not. We are not convinced. Given the contestability 
and multidimensionality of concepts of democracy, continuous measures seem preferable, even if 
they are imperfect. Among the indicators based on the notion that there are gradations of democ-
racy, the one by Marshall and Jaggers (2002)—the Polity IV measure—is the most widely used. 
Although this measure has been severely criticized on various grounds (see, e.g., the critique by 
Treier and Jackman (2008)), we employ it because it is available for a very long time period. How-
ever, Marshall and Jaggers (2002) also present a variable that indicates the degree to which there 
are binding rules that regulate participation in the political process. Binding rules exist not only in 
Western-type democracies, but also in one-party states; they merely regulate participation in differ-
ent ways, namely: (1) “unregulated,” (2) “multiple identities” (there are a few stable and enduring 
groups but few common interests), (3) “sectarian” (indicating intense factionalism and government 
favoritism), (4) “restricted” (significant groups, issues, and/or types of conventional participation 
are regularly excluded from the political process), and (5) “regulated” (where stable and enduring 
groups compete for political influence with little use of coercion). Participation rules are an impor-
tant aspect of political systems and provide a general picture of how the interests of specific groups 
in society are transmitted to political decisionmakers. 
Two important aspects of democratic countries are the degree of political competition and how 
many citizens actually participate in elections through voting. We take these into account by draw-
ing on the measure “democratic competition and participation,” which is the product of these two 
components (Vanhanen 1997). Competition is operationalized by the percentage of votes that are 
not cast for the largest party, whereas participation is measured by the percentage of the population 
that actually voted in the last election. 
In the theoretical section of this paper, we argued that political unrest could be indicative of an in-
creasing likelihood of constitutional change. Banks (2004) presents eight empirical indicators of 
political unrest: (1) number of assassinations, (2) number of general strikes, (3) guerrilla warfare, 
(4) government crises (“any rapidly developing situation that threatens to bring the downfall of the 
present regime—excluding situations of revolt aimed at such overthrow”), (5) purges, (6) riots, (7) 
revolutions, and (8) anti-government demonstrations. Related to these is an indicator specifically   19
focusing on internal armed conflict provided by Gleditsch et al. (2002). On a four-point scale, it de-
scribes the degree of internal armed conflict from 0 (no internal conflict) to 4 (internal war). 
One factor that can ignite social unrest is poor economic performance. Economic performance is 
represented by (1) the level of real gross domestic product per capita and its growth rate; (2) high 
inflation, which signals a failure of macroeconomic policy; and (3) the government share of GDP, 
which is sometimes used as an indicator for the development level of a country. Very low shares 
would indicate an insufficient provision of basic public goods (e.g., Robinson and Torvik 2008). 
An unfavorable development in any of these indicators is thus expected to increase the likelihood 
of observing a demand for constitutional change. Trade openness serves to measure a country’s in-
tegration into the world economy. A high degree of integration is typically a sign of a mature econ-
omy and indicative of a free flow of ideas as well. To a certain extent, trade openness also restrains 
economic policy and thereby the consequences of a particular choice of form of government. We 
would therefore expect that openness will be associated with constitutionally more stable re-
gimes.12 
Finally, we take into account the possibility of “constitutional contagion.” Similar to contagion 
processes in medicine, it is possible that countries might modify their constitution after observing 
constitutional changes in neighboring countries. Here we concentrate on geographic proximity. To 
ensure that we are measuring some sort of imitation behavior rather than a reflection of fundamen-
tal causes, such as the fall of the Iron Curtain, related to specific periods, we also include time 
dummies. 
We cannot exclude the possibility that changes in the form of government are driven by factors de-
pending on a country’s state of development, which are related to per capita income but also to dif-
ferent institutional structures. North et al. (2009) argue that only two dozen states have managed to 
establish what they call “open access societies,” in which both political office and economic activ-
ity are open to entry by newcomers on an impersonal basis. Because open access societies are fun-
damentally different from “natural state societies,” where access to political office is highly re-
stricted, it seems plausible that constitutional change will occur through different mechanisms in 
these two kinds of societies. For lack of a better proxy, we use OECD membership to distinguish 
between the two kinds of regimes. 
                                                 
12   On the other hand, sudden increases in openness can make many people worse off, who might reaction to their 
change of circumstances by protesting against the government. Hence, substantial changes in openness could be 
correlated with high degrees of political instability and, eventually, the possibility of a change in the form of gov-
ernment.   20
Figure 1 (in the introduction to this paper) shows that changes in form of government are rather 
common. Figure 2 offers more detail and illustrates in which of our 10 regions such changes took 
place most often. 
Figure 2: Regional breakdown of changes in form of government from 1950–2003 
 
   21
 
   22
As Figure 2 reveals, a large number of changes occur in the Middle East, North Africa, Africa 
more generally. Few switches took place in Latin America, the Caribbean, the Pacific, East Asia, 
Western Europe, or North America. In Eastern Europe, the end of the Cold War marked a water-
shed in constitutional activity. Note that the newly drafted constitutions of the recently founded 
countries in this region are not counted as constitutional changes in our data set.13 In Africa in the 
1960s, many countries adopted presidential forms of government but in the early 1990s at least 
some of these changes have been reversed. In Southeast Asia and South Asia, the distribution over 
time is fairly even for changes from presidential to parliamentary and vice versa. 
 
5 When Do Countries Change Their Form of Government? 
In this section, we analyze the expected length of time before a switch in form of government is 
observed, as well as some factors influencing its survival time. Figure 3 shows the nonparametric 
Kaplan-Meier estimates of the survival probabilities of form of government over time. The survival 
probability falls in a fairly linear fashion until the 1990s, it accelerates strongly until the mid 1990s, 
and then stagnates. Until 1960, more than 90% of all countries had not changed their form of gov-
ernment. A decade later, this is the case for 80% and in 1980 for 75%. At the start of the 1990s, this 
number falls below 70% and in 1995 it reaches 56%. The most dramatic fall in constitutional sur-
vival occurs from 1992 to 1994, when the probability of no constitutional change drops by almost 
15 percentage points, a development caused by the political changes taking place in Eastern Europe 
after the fall of the Iron Curtain as well as by events in Africa. Within the sample period of about 
50 years, almost 5 out of 10 constitutions were amended to change the form of government. 
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13   Since many of these countries were newly created, we would be analyzing their first constitutional choices rather 
than constitutional change.   23
In Sections 2 and 3, we discussed a number of factors that may influence the probability of a switch 
from one form of government to the other. We now analyze some of these factors in the framework 
of a censored multiple-record-per-subject proportional hazard model. Our choice of covariates in 
the Cox hazard model was guided by our desire to preserve as many countries in the sample as pos-
sible and to avoid any endogeneity with the dependent variable. Note that an upper bound on the 
number of included variables comes from the inclusion of a great number of dummy variables, 
which cause problems in the maximization of the likelihood function. 
Table 1 provides estimates of hazard ratios for a general model (1), including all available covari-
ates and for a reduced model (2), which is the outcome of a consistent testing-down process that 
ensures a high degree of estimation efficiency. The estimated models reflect the experiences of 169 
countries from 1950 to 2003 and are highly significant. 
 
Table 1: Hazard ratio estimates using proportional hazard model (large sample) 
  Model 1  Model 2 
Variables  Hazard ratio SE  Hazard ratio  SE 
Political system variables:          
  Initially  presidential  0.40* 0.147 0.49* 0.150 
  Constitution changed before  0.91  0.343     
Legal  origin:      
  British  Reference category  Reference category 
 French  1.96  0.786     
 Socialist  0.93  0.744     
 German/Scandinavian  0.61  0.637     
Fractionalization:      
 Ethnic  2.43  1.416     
 Linguistic  0.47  0.222     
 Religious  3.00  2.213     
  Number of official languages  1.02  0.029     
Shares of religious groups:         
  Catholic  Reference category  Reference category 
 Muslim  1.01  0.006     
 Protestant  1.00  0.013     
 Others  1.00  0.008     
Colonial  tradition:        24
  Never a colony  Reference category  Reference category 
  Former colonial power   0.95  0.801     
  Former British colony  0.31*  0.152  0.53*  0.144 
  Former French colony  0.21**  0.119  0.47**  0.132 
  Former other colony  0.37  0.226     
Geography:      
 Absolute  latitude  1.48  2.485     
 Landlocked  1.07  0.282     
  Western Europe & North  America  Reference category  Reference category 
  Eastern Europe & post Soviet 
 Union 
0.30 0.378     
 Latin  America  5.04  6.242     
  North Africa & the Middle East  6.14  5.826  13.49**  6.975 
 Sub-Saharan  Africa  4.55  4.869  6.27**  2.097 
 East  Asia  6.09  7.792  7.05**  5.077 
  Southeast  Asia  11.15* 12.51 9.14** 3.996 
 South  Asia  5.23  4.926  8.66**  4.078 
 The  Pacific  1.74  2.737     
 The  Caribbean  0.73  0.884     
(1) No. of observations  227  227 
(2) No. of countries  169  169 
(3) No. of changes  90  90 
(4) Log pseudo-likelihood  -359.6  -371.5 
(5) Joint test remaining variables  Chi
2(27) = 134.4**  Chi
2(8) = 45.75** 
(6) Testing-down from general model    Chi
2(19) = 23.40 
Notes: Estimation method is partial maximum likelihood. Standard errors correct for country clustering. Efron method 
is applied in the case of ties. *(**) indicates significance at a 5% (1%) level. 
 
Most of the variables that remain after the testing-down procedure are related to geography. The 
relative risk of constitutional change is higher in the case of North Africa, the Middle East, Sub-
Saharan Africa, East Asia, Southeast Asia, and South Asia than in other regions. The hazard ratios   25
range from 6 to 13 but are statistically indistinguishable.14  Figure 4 graphically illustrates the 
strong increase in hazard in the case of North Africa and the Middle East.  
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Thus, constitutions in these regions are changed earlier than in other parts of the world. Persson 
and Tabellini (2003, 102) report that geographic variables are important determinants of the choice 
of regime type. We find that geographic variables are also those that tend to explain changes 
thereof. 
We earlier mentioned that the constitutions implemented in newly independent countries may not 
be adequate for their specific needs, as they may reflect the interest of the respective colonial pow-
ers. Former French and British colonies amend their constitutions less often than do countries 
without a colonial history, which does not conform to the hypothesis. Note, however, that this find-
ing does not imply that these constitutions are “optimal” in a welfare sense.  
Countries with initially presidential systems also change their constitutions less often as countries 
with initially parliamentarian systems.15 Figure 5 illustrates the impact of having a presidential sys-
tem as the initial form of government on the survival probabilities. The graph would be almost 
identical in the case of either former British or former French colony.  
 
                                                 
14   The joint restriction that the coefficients, and thereby the hazard ratios, of North Africa & the Middle East, Sub-
Saharan Africa, East Asia, Southeast Asia, and South Asia are equal cannot be rejected at any reasonable level of 
significance (chi2(4) = 6.3). 
15   The joint restriction that the coefficients of former British colony, former French colony, and initially presidential 
are equal cannot be rejected at any reasonable level of significance (chi2(2) = 0.18).   26
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Presidential systems have a higher chance of survival than parliamentary forms of government for 
the predicted values of model (2). This finding, that presidential systems are less likely to experi-
ence a switch than are parliamentary systems, is an interesting one: political scientists have long 
been trying to discover why presidential systems are more likely than parliamentarian systems to 
relapse into autocracy. Our analysis shows that, in another sense, presidential systems are more, 
rather than less, stable when it comes to the permanence of the form of government itself. 
Including more variables that allow for an economic interpretation, rather than just analyzing 
dummies referring primarily to historical circumstances and geography, could be of interest. As ar-
gued above, controlling for polarization in addition to fractionalization (see Esteban and Rey 1994), 
the resource endowment (Gallup at al. 1999), the age of statehood (Bockstette et al. 2002), and 
OECD membership as an indicator of “open access societies” might yield additional insights.16 
However, in the present context, doing so should be viewed more as an auxiliary analysis: Not only 
is it questionable whether some of these indicators are exogenous but we lose half the observations 
in our sample and the number of countries drops from 169 to 87. Therefore, any change in results is 
more likely to be due to these variations in the sample than to the inclusion of additional variables. 
Table 2 contains the reduced model after the testing-down process.17 
 
                                                 
16   We consider 24 OECD member countries that joined before 1974.  
17   Omitted information is available upon request.   27
 
Table 2: Hazard ratio estimates using proportional hazard model (small sample) 
 Model  3   
Variables  Hazard ratio  SE  Variables  Hazard ratio SE 
Political system variables:       Colonial tradition:     
  Initially presidential  2.70   1.891     Never a colony  Reference category 
 Constitution  changed 
 before 
0.22** 0.109   Former  colonial 
 power   
0.30* 0.145   
Legal origin:        Former French colony  0.01**  0.006 
 British  Reference  category Resources   
  French  15.31**   8.297    Share of primary 




   Geography:     
  Ethnic fractionalization  44.89**  33.98    Western Europe & 
 North  America 
Reference category 
 Religious  fractionaliza-
 tion 
7.38  10.82     East Asia  29.88**  26.81 
  Ethnic polarization  0.11**  0.084    The Pacific  18.31**  13.70  
Shares of religious groups:           
 Catholic  Reference  category    
 Muslim  1.03** 0.011         
(1) No. of observations   
(2) No. of countries   
(3) No. of changes   
(4) Log pseudo-likelihood   
(5) Joint test remaining variables   






2(12) = 120.1** 
Chi
2(18) = 25.04   
Notes: Estimation method is partial maximum likelihood. Standard errors correct for country clustering. Efron method 
is applied in the case of ties. *(**) indicates significance at a 5% (1%) level. 
 
Table 2 reveals several new relationships. First, initially presidential has a positive coefficient now, 
i.e., a hazard ratio above unity, but the effect is insignificant.18 Second, there is evidence of an op-
                                                 
18   Note that two variables, initially presidential and religious fractionalization, are not significant according to the indi-
vidual coefficient tests. However, these variables cannot be removed in a consistent testing-down process.   28
timal adjustment as the outcome of change in form of government, as those countries that had re-
formed their constitution once are less likely to alter it again soon. This effect is quite strong, as the 
survival rate is almost 40% if the constitution was changed before, whereas it goes down close to 
zero if it remains unchanged until the 1990s. Third, having a French legal origin increases the rela-
tive risk of constitutional change. However, in this smaller sample this is basically a dummy for 
Afghanistan. Fourth, countries characterized by a high degree of ethnic and religious fractionaliza-
tion are more likely to change their form of government. At the same time, however, countries with 
a high degree of ethnic polarization are relatively less likely to undertake constitutional reform. 
This implies that countries characterized by a large number of ethnic groups show a higher relative 
risk of switching their form of government than countries with two similar groups. Fifth, countries 
with a high share of Muslims tend to amend their constitutions relatively often. Sixth, we find that 
the former colonial powers are less likely to change their constitutions, implying that the constitu-
tions of colonial powers are still adequate in a post-colonial world. Seventh, we discover evidence 
that countries characterized by a high share of primary exports in GNP have a lower relative risk to 
undertake a change in form of government; governments might be able to buy off demands for 
constitutional change with the proceeds from primary exports. 
A comparison of the survival rate of constitutions between models 2 and 3, i.e., between estimates 
based on the large and small samples, is shown in Figure 6. 
 
Figure 6: Comparing survival rates of constitutions based on large and small samples 
 
 
From Figure 6, it is apparent that there is a notable difference between both functions. The small 
sample estimate shows a much lower survival rate from the 1960s onward, whereas the transforma-
tion phase in the 1990s after the fall of the Iron Curtain is much more pronounced in the function   29
based on the larger sample. Thus, the choice of the sample has a substantial impact on the esti-
mated duration of form of government.  
The next question almost suggests itself: What are the factors that cause changes in the form of 
government? Our answers to this question are given in Section 6. 
 
6 Why Do Countries Change Their Form of Government? 
We study the question of why constitutions change in the framework of fixed-effects panel data 
logit models using a change in the form of government as the dependent variable. The unbalanced 
sample comprises 153 countries and the estimation period is 1950–2003. To reduce endogeneity 
problems, all variables except the time trend are lagged by one year. Lagging the variables by two 
periods yields similar results. Higher lags result in nonconverging estimations. Employing more 
than one lag creates high collinearity between the lags. We employ a fixed-effects estimator, which 
is consistent under rather general conditions, as there are doubts that the country-specific effects 
are orthogonal to the other covariates of the model.19 
Table 3 shows that even though most of the individual variables in the fixed-effects panel model 
are insignificant, the joint test of the regressors indicates that the model has significant explanatory 
power. Applying a zero restriction on 28 variables that cannot be rejected results in the reduced 
model. The remaining 10 variables are highly significant as a group and individually significant at 
least at the 5% level.20 We base our interpretation on the results obtained from the reduced model. 
 
Table 3: Explaining changes in the form of government (fixed-effects panel model) 
  General model  Reduced model 




General political indicators:   
  Degree of democratization  0.125 0.112  0.097*  0.041
  Number of international 
  NGOs in country 
-0.0001 0.001   
 Democratic  competition 
  and participation  
-0.098* 0.049 -0.109** 0.034
                                                 
19   For the general model (1), a reliable Hausman test cannot be performed for this sample of data as the relevant vari-
ance-covariance matrix is not positive-definite. Differencing the data to account for fixed effects substantially de-
creases the number of groups. However, robustness tests show that coefficients and significance of the reduced 
model (2) are close to those obtained from a random-effects model relying on 153 countries. 
20   The marginal level of significance for intermediate internal armed conflict is 0.54.   30
Types of political participa-
tion: 
 
  Restricted  Reference category Reference category
 Multiple  identities  -1.751 1.417  
 Sectarian  1.256 0.977 0.908*  0.458
 Regulated  -14.52 2747  
Political unrest   
 Assassinations  0.078 0.182  
 General  strikes  0.122 0.326  
 Guerrilla  warfare  -0.925 0.610  
 Government  crises  0.137 0.349 0.475*  0.220
 Purges  -0.105 0.417  
 Riots  0.033 0.167  
 Revolutions  -0.714 0.488  
 Anti-government  demon-
 strations 
-0.127 0.151  
Armed conflicts:   
  No internal armed conflict  Reference category Reference category
  Minor internal armed 
 conflict 
-0.368 1.053  
  Intermediate internal armed 
 conflict 
0.670 0.938 1.118 0.580
 Internal  war  0.216 1.490  
Distribution of resources:   
  Share of family farms  -0.011 0.036  
 Knowledge  distribution    -0.003 0.089 -0.095**  0.028
  Share of urban population  0.073  0.066   
Economic variables:   
 Real  GDP  -0.0002 0.0003  
  Real GDP growth rate  -0.024 0.029  
 Inflation  rate  0.007 0.006  
 Openness  -0.020 0.018  
  Government share in GDP  0.021 0.059  
Regional contagion:   31
  Eastern Europe & post 
 Soviet  Union 
21.19 2870  
 Latin  America  20.71 3503  
  North Africa & the Middle 
 East 
19.87 2366  
 Sub-Saharan  Africa  21.57 2232  
 East  Asia  20.13 4580  
 Southeast  Asia  22.16 2695  
 South  Asia  20.10 5556  
 The  Pacific  20.22 28301  
Time trends: 
 Year  -0.082 0.086  
 Period  1960s  -0.381 1.391 2.448**  0.939
 Period  1970s  0.697 1.835 2.685**  1.024
 Period  1980s  -0.078 2.541 2.728*  1.135
 Period  1990s  0.953 2.941 3.898**  1.232
 Period  2000s  1.036 3.283 3.794**  1.438
(1) No. of observations  1116  1116 
(2) No. of groups  35  35 
(3) Log likelihood  -84.56  -166.2 
(4) Test of joint significance  Chi
2(39) = 199.8**  Chi
2(11) = 36.5** 
(5) Testing-down restriction    Chi
2(28) = 12.7 
Notes: All variables, except time trends and regional contagion indicators, enter the model lagged 
by one year. Estimation by random-effects panel data logit models. * (**) indicate significance at a 
5% (1%) level. To avoid multicollinearity, regional contagion indicators for Western Europe & 
North America and for the Caribbean were omitted. 
 
Since estimated coefficients from logit models are difficult to interpret, we rely on estimated elas-
ticities or marginal effects computed at the means of the respective variables reported in Table 4.21 
We find that democratization has a significantly positive impact on the likelihood of a change in 
the form of government. A 1% increase in the degree of democratization raises the likelihood of a 
switch in the form of government in the following year by 2 percentage points. Thus, political 
processes influencing the de facto degree of democratization will affect de jure institutions too. 
                                                 
21   The elasticities were derived under the assumption that the fixed effect is zero.   32
When countries are characterized by a substantial amount of political competition and participation, 
it becomes less likely that there will be constitutional change. A 1% increase in this factor lowers 
the likelihood of a change in the form of government by about 2 percentage points. The degree of 
party competition when supported by a significant number of active voters can be interpreted as an 
integral part of a working democracy. Thus, when the political system exhibits these characteristics, 
it becomes more difficult to create a majority large enough to effect constitutional changes. Look-
ing at the joint effect of the significant democracy-related variables suggests that if a higher degree 
of democratization is achieved by increasing democratic competition and participation, there will 
be no net change on the likelihood of a change in the form of government. 
 







Degree of democratization  0.02*  0.010  0.56 
Democratic competition and participation  -0.02*  0.009  11.8 
Sectarian political participation  0.21  0.129  Dummy 
Government crises  0.10  0.060  0.19 
Intermediate internal armed conflict  0.27  0.141  Dummy 
Knowledge distribution  -0.02**  0.007  42.3 
Period 1960s  0.54**  0.145  Dummy 
Period 1970s  0.58**  0.172  Dummy 
Period 1980s  0.59**  0.202  Dummy 
Period 1990s  0.75**  0.127  Dummy 
Period 2000s  0.66**  0.141  Dummy 
Notes: * (**) indicate significance on a 5% (1%) level. Marginal effects were computed at the 
means of the respective variables. In the case of a dummy variable, the marginal effect reflects the 
change from 0 to 1. 
 
A move from a restricted system of political participation, the most common form in our sample, 
where some organized political participation is permitted without intense factionalism, but signifi-
cant groups, issues, and/or types of conventional participation are regularly excluded from the po-
litical process, to a sectarian system increases the probability of a change in the form of govern-
ment by about 20 percentage points. In a sectarian system, political demands are dominated by in-
compatible interests and multiple identity groups and fluctuate between factionalism and active fa-
voritism by whichever group controls the government. Our estimates suggest that these political   33
systems are not perceived as optimal by the societies they govern and foster the likelihood of a 
constitutional change. 
When a government is shaken by (nonviolent) crises, the probability that there will be a change in 
the form of government in the following year rises strongly. A 1% hike in the number of crises in-
creases the likelihood of a modification in the form of government in the next period by 10 per-
centage points. Intermediate internal armed conflicts raise the probability of changes in the form of 
government 27 percentage points. Thus, the combination of government crises and serious armed 
conflict among different interest groups in a country foreshadow constitutional reforms. 
An increase in the distribution of knowledge in a country lowers the likelihood of reform in the 
system of government by about 2 percentage points. Hence, a decrease in the share of students and 
literates in the population makes constitutional reform more likely. 
Finally, we estimate significant time period dummies. Specifically, in all decades after 1950 the 
probability of constitutional amendment increased by 55 to 75 percentage points. Among those 
decades, in the 1990s there was a statistically higher likelihood of changing form of government 
than in all other periods.22 Note that we find no evidence of contagion in changes in the form of 
government. Thus, countries in one region do not change their constitution because other countries 
in the same region have done so, which suggests that domestic rather than international factors are 
of chief importance. 
To summarize, the most important factors explaining changes in the form of government are politi-
cal in nature and related to intermediate internal armed conflict, sectarian political participation, 
degree of democratization, and party competition, as well as distributional aspects relating to 
knowledge. It is interesting to note that economic factors do not play much of a role: neither differ-
ences in the level of income, nor its growth rate, nor other macroeconomic factors, nor economic 
openness are relevant in predicting changes in the form of government.23  
 
                                                 
22   The coefficients on the 1990s and 2000s dummies, respectively, are statistically indistinguishable. 
23   Note that these political variables themselves are likely subject to economic influences. Preliminary analysis in the 
framework of logit fixed effects panel data models using the first lags of our economic variables reveals the follow-
ing influences: (i) degree of democracy depends positively on real GDP per capita, real GDP growth, government 
share, and openness; (ii) government crises depend negatively on real GDP per capita, real GDP growth, and open-
ness; (iii) sectarian political participation depends negatively on openness; (iv) democratic competition and participa-
tion depends positively on real GDP per capita and negatively on real GDP growth and government share; (v) in-
termediate internal war depends positively on government share and negatively on real GDP per capita. A thorough 
analysis of these relationships would be interesting but is beyond the scope of the present paper and, therefore, 
must be left for future research.    34
 
7 Conclusions and Outlook 
Using data for as many as 169 countries, we analyze two main research questions: (1) When is a 
constitutional switch from one form of government to another likely to occur, and—given that a 
switch has indeed been observed—(2) Why did it occur? The first question is answered by analyz-
ing time-invariant factors in the framework of a proportional hazard model; the second question is 
investigated by considering time-variant factors in the context of a fixed-effects panel data logit 
model. A switch is more likely to occur earlier if the “initial constitution” is presidential rather than 
parliamentary, if the country was never a British or French colony, and if the country is located in 
the Middle East, North Africa, Sub-Saharan Africa, East Asia, Southeast Asia, or South Asia. In a 
much smaller sample, we find evidence that other factors may also play a role in when a constitu-
tion will be changed. If the form of government has already been altered at least once, there is a 
lower relative risk that it will be changed again. Former colonial powers are also less likely to 
change their constitutions soon. In ethnically and religiously fractionalized countries, as well as 
those with a high proportion of Muslims, reforms in the system of government become more likely; 
in ethnically polarized countries, the likelihood decreases. We find evidence  that countries relying 
to a large degree on primary sector exports change their institutions (here, the form of government) 
less frequently. 
Our investigation into why countries’ change their constitutions reveals that political factors are 
much more important than economic factors, which do not play any significant role. Moreover, 
domestic rather than international influences appear to be the dominant ones. Still, there are world-
wide trends; for example, the fall of the Iron Curtain led to many changes in a specific time period. 
Constitutional reform becomes more likely under systems of sectarian political participation, where 
incompatible interests lead to intense factionalism and government favoritism by the group in 
power. Moreover, government crises and limited armed internal conflict in the preceding year will 
also increase the likelihood of constitutional change. There are equal-sized effects related to the 
implementation of democracy in a country: those countries characterized by a higher degree of de-
mocratization will be more likely to implement changes, whereas the probability of change will be 
lower if there is strong democratic competition and participation. Decreases in the distribution of 
knowledge in a country make it more likely that the society will reform its system of government. 
In Persson and Tabellini (2003), the presidential form of government is found to be correlated with 
a number of desirable fiscal policy traits as well as desirable governance outcomes; however, it is 
not correlated with better total factor productivity. Persson (2005) finds that parliamentary systems 
are more likely to choose structural policy reforms that eventually lead to higher growth and in-
come. It is thus unclear from these studies which form of government is “better” and our results are   35
no help in this matter: apparently, government does not come in a “one size fits all.” The most ade-
quate form of government for any particular country might depend on a number of fairly exoge-
nous conditions. If we refuse to look beyond the simple dichotomy between presidential and par-
liamentary systems, this is a serious blow to those who emphasize that countries have a genuine 
choice as to form of government. Our results seem to indicate that the choice might be fairly lim-
ited. Alternatively, our findings could be interpreted as a reflection of the fact that we do not yet 
understand completely the factors relevant to choice of a specific form of government. 
In Section 2, we briefly summarized two competing conceptions of the presidential form of gov-
ernment. One stresses the higher degree of separation of powers and deduces a number of positive 
effects therefrom. The other stresses the majoritarian character of presidential systems and conjec-
tures that a number of negative consequences are likely to ensue. Which of these views is “true” is 
something we cannot definitively answer—most likely, both are correct to some degree. It is our 
opinion that this debate cannot be settled unless scholars are willing to go beyond looking merely 
at the simple dichotomy between presidential and parliamentary systems. We suggest that future 
studies consider finer-grained institutional detail, such as how the president is elected (directly or 
indirectly), whether he or she is subject to term limits, length of term of office (assuming that long 
terms are conducive to more authoritarian and less accountable governments), whether there is a 
vice-president and how that person is elected, how broad the competencies of the president are (e.g., 
commander-in-chief of the army), and so forth.24 
We also believe it would be fruitful to analyze the effects of changing the form of government 
more closely. It could be error, for example, to assume that the “original” choice was not an equi-
librium and that the switch created one. Our results from the smaller sample suggest that are very 
few “serial switchers” and that the probability of changing the form of government again after do-
ing it once is quite low. But if the form of government has important effects on economic variables 
such as fiscal policy or total factor productivity, then it is reasonable to wonder whether a change 
in the form of government will actually induce changes in these policy or outcome variables. 
Moreover, many political scientists assume that the form of government is irrelevant once a coun-
try has relapsed into autocracy, but is this true? Finding out would be an interesting task: Does the 
form of government still cause effects even if a country is not democratic? 
                                                 
24   Shugart and Carey (1992, Ch. 8) propose two dimensions to ascertain the powers of presidents: (1) their power over 
legislation and (2) their nonlegislative powers. Regarding (1), they propose considering presidential power to veto 
and partial veto, the competence to pass legislation via decrees, the exclusive competence to initiate legislative pro-
posals, the power to initiate budget proposals, and the competence to propose referendums. Regarding (2), they 
mention cabinet formation, dismissal of cabinet members, the “lack of assembly censure,” and the power to dissolve 
parliament.   36
Our paper takes the first step toward empirically endogenizing specific constitutional institutions, 
namely, the form of government. The next and very obvious step would be to endogenize other in-
stitutions that have also been found to display significant economic effects, such as electoral rules, 
federalism, and direct democracy. After having identified some determinants of these institutions, 
the next step might be to analyze their co-evolution, i.e., the interdependence of institutional 
change. It would be fascinating to analyze the interaction between the change of formal constitu-
tional rules, on the one hand, and the change in informal rules, on the other. 
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Table A1: Descriptive statistics of data reported in hazard rate analysis 
Variable Obs.  Mean  Std.  Dev.  Min.  Max. 
Absolute latitude  227  0.285  0.183  0  0.72 
Constitution changed before  227  0.260  0.440  0  1 
East Asia   227  0.031  0.173  0  1 
Eastern Europe and post Soviet Union  227  0.137  0.344  0  1 
Ethnic fractionalization  227  0.470  0.262  0  0.93 
Ethnic polarization  215  0.541  0.242  0.02  0.98 
Former colonial power  227  0.04  0.196  0  1 
Former British colony  227  0.308  0.463  0  1 
Former French colony  227  0.154  0.362  0  1 
Former other colony  227  0.171  0.377  0  1 
Initially presidential  227  0.564  0.497  0  1 
Landlocked 227  0.233  0.424  0  1 
Linguistic  fractionalization  227 0.419 0.29 0.002 0.92 
Latin America   227  0.079  0.271  0  1 
Legal origin: French  227  0.427  0.496  0  1 
Legal origin: German/Scandinavian  227  0.0573  0.233  0  1 
Legal origin: Socialist  227  0.185  0.389  0  1 
North Africa & the Middle East  227  0.115  0.319  0  1 
Number of official languages  227  2.057  3.668  1  36 
Religious fractionalization  227  0.439  0.242  0.003  0.86 
Share of Muslims  227  25.836  36.589  0  99.8 
Share of other religions  227  34.147  32.301  0.100  100 
Share of primary  exports in GDP  183  0.154  0.153  0.01  0.89 
Share of Protestants  227  12.333  20.187  0  97.8 
South Asia   227  0.048  0.215  0  1 
Southeast Asia   227  0.07  0.257  0  1 
Sub-Saharan Africa  227  0.295  0.457  0  1 
The Caribbean  227  0.048  0.215  0  1 
The Pacific  227  0.04  0.196  0  1 
   42
Table A2: Descriptive statistics of data reported in logit analysis 
Variable Obs.  Mean  Std.  Dev.  Min.  Max. 
Anti-government demonstrations  4760  0.63  2.07  0  60 
Assassinations 4760  0.23  1.06  0  25 
Change in form of government  4760  0.01  0.12  0  1 
Degree of democratization  4760  0.52  7.66  -10  10 
Democratic competition and participation  4760  11.53  13.15  0  49 
General strikes  4760  0.16  0.59  0  13 
Government crises  4760  0.20  0.56  0  7 
Government share in GDP  4760  19.64  9.67  2.10  72.54 
Guerrilla warfare  4760  0.22  0.71  0  15 
Inflation rate  4760  0.90  17.18  -95.27  502.0 
Intermediate internal armed conflict  4760  0.05  0.23  0  1 
Minor internal minor armed conflict  4760  0.05  0.22  0  1 
Internal war  4760  0.04  0.20  0  1 
Knowledge distribution  4760  41.90  23.56  0.5  99.5 
Number of international NGOs in country  4760  418.8  509.9  1.5  3523 
Openness 4760  60.60  41.09  0.85  425.3 
Political participation: Regulated  4760  0.25  0.43  0  1 
Political participation: Restricted  4760  0.43  0.49  0  1 
Political participation: Sectarian  4760  0.14  0.34  0  1 
Purges 4760  0.15  0.76  0  34 
Real GDP  4760  4,003  5,393  64.39  43130 
Real GDP growth rate  4760  4.80  7.91  -167.2  53.63 
Revolutions 4760  0.19  0.53  0  9 
Riots 4760  0.58  2.14  0  55 
Share of family farms  4760  44.82  23.78  0  98 
Share of urban population  4760  38.53  23.77  1  100 
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Table A3: List of variables (definitions and sources) 
Absolute latitude: 
Defined as the absolute value of the latitude of the capital city, divided by 90 to take values between 0 and 
1; source: CIA (2005). 
Anti-government demonstrations: 
Number of anti-government demonstrations in a specific year; source: Banks (2004, variable S18F1). 
Assassinations: 
Number of assassinations in a specific year; source: Banks (2004, variable S17F1). 
Change in form of government: 
Dependent variable in panel analysis; form of government changes either from presidential to parliamen-
tary or vice versa; source: Banks (2004). 
Constitution changed before: 
Variable indicating that the form of government has already been changed at least once within our sample 
period. 
Degree of democratization: 
Revised Combined Polity Score with a scale ranging from +10 (strongly democratic) to -10 (strongly auto-
cratic); source: Marshall and Jaggers (2002). 
Democratic competition and participation: 
This index is the percentage of votes not cast for the largest party (competition) times the percentage of the 
population that actually voted in the election (participation). This product is divided by 100 to form an in-
dex that in principle could vary from 0 (no democracy) to 100 (full democracy); source: Vanhanen (2000, 
2005). 
East Asia: 
Regional dummy variable equal to 1 if a country is in East Asia (including Japan and Mongolia), 0 other-
wise; source: Teorell & Hadenius (2005). 
Eastern Europe and post Soviet Union: 
Regional dummy variable equal to 1 if the country is in Eastern Europe and post Soviet Union (including 
Central Asia), 0 otherwise; source: Teorell & Hadenius (2005). 
Ethnic fractionalization: 
Reflects the probability that two randomly selected people from a given country will not belong to the same 
ethno-linguistic group; source: Alesina et al. (2003). 
Ethnic polarization: 
Esteban and Ray (1994). 
Former British colony: 
Dummy variable equal to 1 if the country is a former colony of Britain, 0 otherwise; source: Teorell & Ha-
denius (2005). 
Former French colony: 
Dummy variable equal to 1 if the country is a former colony of France, 0 otherwise; source: Teorell & Ha-
denius (2005). 
Former other colony: 
Dummy variable equal to 1 if the country is a former Spanish, Dutch, Italian, U.S., Belgian, Portuguese, 
British-French, or Australian colony, 0 otherwise; source: Teorell & Hadenius (2005). 
General strikes: 
Number of general strikes in a specific year; source: Banks (2004, variable S17F2). 
Government crises: 
Number of government crises in a specific year; source: Banks (2004, variable S17F4). 
Government share of GDP: 
Share of government expenditures of GDP in %; source: Heston et al. (2006), own computations. 
Guerrilla warfare: 
Number of armed activities aimed at the overthrow of present regime in a specific year; source: Banks 
(2004, variable S17F3). 
Inflation rate: 
Rate of change of GDP deflator in PPP units; source: Heston et al. (2006), own computations. 
Initially presidential: 
Variable indicating that at the start of our sample data the form of government was presidential.  
Intermediate internal armed conflict: 
Intermediate internal armed conflict; source: Gleditsch et al. (2002).   44
Minor internal armed conflict: 
Minor internal armed conflict; source: Gleditsch et al. (2002). 
Internal war: 
Internal war; source: Gleditsch et al. (2002). 
Knowledge distribution: 
An index combining the arithmetic mean of the number of students at universities or other institutions of 
higher education per 100,000 inhabitants of the country and literates as a percentage of adult population; 
source: Vanhanen (2000, 2005). 
Landlocked: 
Dummy variable that takes on a value of 1 if a country is enclosed or nearly enclosed by land; source: 
Wikipedia. 
Linguistic fractionalization: 
Reflects the probability that two randomly selected people from a given country will not belong to the same 
linguistic group; source: Alesina et al. (2003). 
Latin America: 
Regional dummy variable equal to 1 if the country is in Latin America (including Cuba, Haiti, and the Do-
minican Republic), 0 otherwise; source: Teorell & Hadenius (2005). 
Legal Origin: British: 
Identifies the legal origin of the company law or commercial code of each country; source: La Porta et al. 
(1999).  
Legal Origin: French: 
Identifies the legal origin of the company law or commercial code of each country; source: La Porta et al. 
(1999).  
Legal Origin: German/Scandinavian: 
Identifies the legal origin of the Company Law or Commercial Code of each country; source: La Porta et 
al. (1999).  
North Africa & the Middle East: 
Regional dummy variable equal to 1 if the country is in the Middle East (including Israel, Turkey, and Cy-
prus) or North Africa, 0 otherwise; source: Teorell & Hadenius (2005).  
Number of international NGOs in country: 
The number of international NGOs working within a country; source: Paxton (2002). 
Number of official languages: 
The number of officially recognized languages in a country; source: Wikipedia. 
Openness: 
Exports plus imports divided by GDP in %; source: Heston et al. (2006). 
Political participation: Multiple identities: 
There are relatively stable and enduring political groups that compete for political influence at the national 
level—parties, regional groups, or ethnic groups—that are not necessarily elected, but there are few recog-
nized, overlapping (common) interests; source: Marshall and Jaggers (2002). 
Political participation: Regulated: 
Relatively stable and enduring political groups regularly compete for political influence and positions with 
little use of coercion. No significant groups, issues, or types of conventional political action are regularly 
excluded from the political process; Marshall and Jaggers (2002). 
Political participation: Restricted: 
Some organized political participation is permitted without intense factionalism, but significant groups, is-
sues, and/or types of conventional participation are regularly excluded from the political process; source: 
Marshall and Jaggers (2002). 
Political participation: Sectarian: 
Political demands are characterized by incompatible interests and intransigent posturing among multiple 
identity groups and oscillate more or less regularly between intense factionalism and government favorit-
ism; source: Marshall and Jaggers (2002). 
Purges: 
Number of systematic eliminations of political opposition in a specific year; source: Banks (2004, variable 
S17F5). 
Real GDP growth rate: 
Growth rate of real gross domestic product per capita in U.S. dollars converted using PPP in %; source: 
Heston et al. (2006), own computations. 
Real GDP:   45
Real gross domestic product per capita in U.S. dollars converted using PPP; source: Heston et al. (2006). 
Regional contagion: 
Measures whether a change in the form of government in one country of a region triggers a constitutional 
reform in another country of the same region. Indicator variables for every region were constructed by al-
lowing for a five-year window after one country changed its constitution. 
Religious fractionalization: 
Reflects the probability that two randomly selected people from a given country will not belong to the same 
religious group; source: Alesina et al. (2003). 
Revolutions: 
Number of successful or unsuccessful revolutionary actions in a specific year; source: Banks (2004, vari-
able S17F7). 
Riots: 
Number of riots in a specific year; source: Banks (2004, variable S17F6). 
Share of family farms: 
The area of family farms as a percentage of total cultivated area or total area of holdings; source: Vanhanen 
(2000, 2005). 
Share of primary exports in GNP: 
Share of exports of primary products in GNP in 1970; source: Gallup et al. (1999). 
Share of Muslims: 
Percentage of the population in a country professing to be Muslims in 1980 (younger states are counted 
based on their average from 1990 to 1995); source: La Porta (1999). 
Share of other religions: 
Percentage of the population in a country professing to be neither Muslim, Protestant, nor Catholic in 1980 
(younger states are counted based on their average from 1990 to 1995); source: La Porta (1999). 
Share of Protestants: 
Percentage of the population in a country professing the Protestant religion in 1980 (younger states are 
counted based on their average from 1990 to 1995); source: La Porta (1999). 
Share of urban population: 
Urban population as a percentage of total population; source: Vanhanen (2000, 2005). 
South Asia: 
Regional dummy variable equal to 1 if a country is in South Asia, 0 otherwise; source: Teorell & Hadenius 
(2005). 
Southeast Asia: 
Regional dummy variable equal to 1 if the country is in Southeast Asia, 0 otherwise; source: Teorell & Ha-
denius (2005). 
Sub-Saharan Africa: 
Regional dummy variable equal to 1 if the country is in Sub-Saharan Africa, 0 otherwise; source: Teorell & 
Hadenius (2005). 
The Caribbean 
Regional dummy variable equal to 1 if the country is in the Caribbean (including Beliz, Guyana, and Suri-
name), 0 otherwise; source: Teorell & Hadenius (2005). 
The Pacific: 
Regional dummy variable equal to 1 if the country is in the Pacific (excluding Australia and New Zealand), 
0 otherwise; source: Teorell & Hadenius (2005). 
Year: 
Year of observation. 
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